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I) Introduction  
Regulation is a key issue in European debate. For instance, the OECD has 
argued that better regulation could improve “economic and social welfare 
prospects, underpin growth and strengthen resilience” (OECD, 2012). However, 
the increased attention on the improvement of regulatory techniques and the 
concrete experience with regulatory issues may divert attention from a 
conventional understanding of how employment regulation occurs.  
 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the debate on the specific subject of 
regulatory theory in the area of labour law and employment relations, to better 
understand the dynamic and fluid nature of employment regulation.  The article 
argues that the regulatory approach in the area of employment relations cannot 
be exclusively focused on the technical legal perspective, but should also 
examine other ways in which regulation can occur. From this, we outline a 
theoretical framework that can enhance understanding of the more dynamic 
nature of the activities concerned with employment relations regulation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the need for a broader 
perspective on employment regulation. Section III discusses the theory of 
‘regulatory space’, tracing its development from the theoretical 
conceptualisation outlined by Hancher and Moran (1989) to recent contributions 
by Vibert (2014), among others. Section IV presents the core of the paper, 
including the components and dimensions of the proposed (multi-level) 
regulatory framework, which helps advance knowledge beyond the singularly 
narrow or exclusive legal discourse on employment regulation. Finally, the 
paper addresses current understandings of regulation, de-regulation and, 
importantly, the politics of “re”-regulation.  
 
II) The Transformation of Work and Employment Regulation 
Scholars direct attention to models of regulation that take account of legal, 
supranational and collective regulation (Dickens, 2004; Collins, 2001; Stone 
and Arthurs, 2013). Regulation is traditionally conceived as a governmental 
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activity, exercised by national (or supranational) institutions or other bodies, 
which include corporations, trade unions, self-regulators, professionals, trade 
bodies or voluntary organisations. It is often seen as an instrument for 
restricting and embedding human behaviour, but also for preventing undesired 
outcomes; regulation may also have an enabling and facilitative role (Baldwin et 
al., 2012).1 Regulation can be explained by several methods and from multiple 
perspectives: the approach that this paper will explore is the institutionalist 
dimension of regulation and, more precisely, the institutionalist theorisation 
given by the metaphor of ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher and Moran, 1989). 
 
Among many others purposes, the regulatory activity of a democratic society in 
the area of the employment relationship has - from the traditional perspective of 
labour law at least - the clear objective of balancing the interests of the parties 
to the employment contract (the employer and the employee), limiting their 
freedom to contract through various dispositions, concessions and constraints.2 
Recognition of the historical imbalance between the employer and the 
employee has been the corner stone of several norms for the protection of the 
subordinated subject; namely, the worker. However, the emergence of new 
forms of work and employment which cannot rely exclusively on the standard 
employment contract (i.e. ‘atypical’, ‘flexible’ jobs; growth in self-employment or 
dependent self-employment) calls into question the traditional assumptions of 
contractual subordination, and other factors such as new managerial strategies 
endorse employer power and control (Stone and Arthurs, 2014, p.3). 
 
Extant literature draws attention on the changing nature of work and the decline 
of the standard employment relationship (SER) (Adams and Deakin, 2014; 
                                                        
1 The idea of balance between security and flexibility (the so called ‘flexicurity’), for instance, is 
an example of view of the approach of legal regulation which is enabling rather than 
constraining (Dickens, 2004, p. 603).  
2 There is an ancient “tension in the system” as Lord Wedderburn (1965, p. 5) reports in his 
book,  learning from the scholarship of Otto Kahn-Freund: ‘For the common law assumes it is 
dealing with a contract made by equals, but in reality, save in exceptional circumstances, the 
individual worker brings no equality of bargaining power to the labour market and to this 
transaction central to his life whereby the employer buys his labour power. This individual 
relationship, in its inception, is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of 
subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by the 
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract of employment’.  
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Stone and Arthurs, 2014). The current debate addresses the challenge to go 
beyond the SER, to the need to tackle the drifts from decent work, and to 
balance equity, voice, fairness and performance in the employment relationship 
(Budd, 2004). Transformations point to debates and issues concerned with, for 
example, protecting disadvantaged workers, implications arising from the 
‘feminization of work’ (Rubery, 2015) and challenges coming from the 
internationalization of labour and migrant labour flows (Dundon et al., 2007; 
Thompson et al., 2013).  
 
In the European context, employment regulation has increased its complexity 
through an expansion of (individualistic) legal rights in many aspects of labour 
relations (e.g. health and safety, hours, employee voice, equality and non-
discrimination rights). At the same time, many attempts to reduce the 
embedding effect of hard law on the other means of regulation (such as 
voluntarism or unilateralism) have been fostered by changes arising from a 
global neo-liberal ideological and political project weakening organised labour in 
liberal market economies (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000; McDonough and 
Dundon, 2010). In the UK and Ireland, for instance, the favourite regulatory 
approach is characterised by soft law and ‘light touch’ regulation, rather than 
‘hard’ statutory prescription; this approach aims to ‘lighten the regulatory 
burden’ on businesses and corporations while at the same time providing a 
minimum standard of rights (Dickens, 2004; Dobbins, 2010). 
 
The increased complexity of the regulatory role of the EU and the expanded 
‘transnationalization’ of labour has resulted in competing structural issues 
between opposing aims and objectives from various political and economic 
constitutions of Member States. However, with national differences, peculiarities 
and political ideologies of EU Member countries, regulation (in its broader 
sense, not just legal) can cut across the national boundaries ‘to match new 
transnational (or boundaryless) organizational forms and employment patterns’, 
mainly because ‘in the knowledge economy national boundaries can be crossed 
easily and speedily’ (Dickens, 2004, p. 607). 
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The peculiarity of the historical moment goes beyond the incidence of the 
economic crisis on the transformation of labour. It is also necessary to consider 
the impact of changes within the inherent features of the traditional labour 
market pattern. The decline of trade union membership has led to a 
represention gap and potential structural reconfiguration of the labour market 
with a renewed (unilateral managerial) emphasis on voluntary and/or 
individualistic patterns of employment rule-making.  
 
Hancher and Moran (1989, p. 148) stress the importance of considering work 
and employment changes as highly dynamic under the advanced capitalism, 
including not only rates of growth and sudden innovations in technology and 
market practices, but also exploitation and work degradation. From a regulatory 
perspective this dynamism raises two fundamental issues: what is the new area 
to be regulated, and by whom? Those questions are of fundamental importance 
for developing a comprehensive theory on employment regulation, because ‘in 
regulatory politics most of the contests for authority to settle issues surround 
newly invented products or marketing forms, for which some regulatory arena 
has to be found’ (1989, p. 170). Consequently, the paradigm of employment 
regulation must also deal with issues outside the traditional legal modus 
operandi on employment regulation. To understand variable forms of regulation 
beyond the exclusively narrow legal focus, two related or overlapping points can 
be considered.  
 
First, we consider those areas that employment regulation may cover, but 
where no specific rule has been produced due to employment market changes. 
Alternatively, if a work rule exists, it may not have been enforced or made 
effective to regulate new (transformed) work relations. Examples here may 
include the rise of zero hours contracts, and the issues generated by a greater 
participation of women in the labour market (the so-called ‘feminization of 
labour’ (Rubery and Rafferty, 2013)), involving not only the gender composition 
of labour market, but also what flows from that, such as the feminization of skills 
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and certain jobs (e.g. part-time flexible work, casual work, and the increased 
prevalence of this type of work). Issues also include the increase of economic 
migration (permitted by a greater possibility of labour mobility or a strong 
framework of rights at the supranational level); or the effects of new 
technologies on the organization of labour. In these cases the challenge for the 
regulatory actors is to understand and evaluate the possible impact of the 
transformations on people’s behaviours and social needs, in order to provide  
prompt protection and a forward-looking strategy. 
 
Second, the argument for a broader socio-economic and politically-orientated 
‘regulatory framework’ advances issues that go beyond the dichotomy of 
regulation versus deregulation. Deregulation cannot simply describe a 
dichotomy between the presence or absence of rules. As outlined in the next 
section, a more inclusive theory of regulatory aspects and dimensions suggests 
that this process is rather a ceding of regulatory authority to other actors, 
institutions or arenas of rule-making and employment.  
 
III) The Regulatory Space  
As noted previously, the range of regulatory theories is wide and fragmented: 
Morgan and Yeung (2007, p.16) have identified three main categories of 
regulation, which can be divided into public interest theories, private interest 
theories and institutionalist theories. If the first two theories describe antithetic 
perspectives regarding the role given to private and public actors, the third 
includes a complexity in itself: the public and private spheres are seen as co-
habitants of the same space, as well as necessary counterparts.  
 
In the field of employment relations, the institutionalist approach ‘is intended to 
capture any theory where rule-based spheres, or the relationship between 
different ruled-based spheres, play an important role in explaining why or how 
regulation emerges’ (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 53). The theory of ‘regulatory 
space’ is one institutionalist approach, which, it is argued, offers a particularly 
useful conceptual framework for the analysis of how work is regulated and how 
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actors participate in and contribute to this progressive elaboration of formal and 
informal rules. Since its first theorisation, elaborated by Hancher and Moran 
(1989), the metaphor of regulatory space has been extended and further 
developed, to help explain the broader complexity of regulation by considering 
dominant approaches, political decisions and the ‘limits’ and (implicitly) ‘the 
potential for law as one instrument of governance’ (Scott, 2001, p. 330).  
 
One of the primary requirements of regulatory space is that it can be both 
‘occupied’ and ‘contested’ by actors. The idea that the occupancy of regulatory 
space is contestable engages with Edwards’ contribution regarding an inherent 
‘structured antagonism’ between the parties to the employment relationship 
(Edwards, 1986). This space-occupancy can be unevenly allocated between 
the parties, according to the existing power relations and mobilisation of 
resources at different (transnational, national, sectoral or workplace) levels 
(Dundon et al., 2014). The amount of space that an actor or group of actors 
occupy in a precise moment can be affected by historical, contingent and 
economic factors: regulation is thus not just situated in space, but also over time 
(Hancher and Moran, 1989, p. 155). In their original theorization, Hancher and 
Moran stressed that ‘the economic regulation3 is predominantly regulation by 
and through organizations’ (Hancher and Moran, 1989, p. 160). The ways in 
which organizations are characterised can vary, and individuals may be able to 
access regulatory space only ‘because they have some organisational role’ 
(e.g. employees in a firm, civil servants of a government department, or 
members of unions). Accordingly, the ‘organisational status is the most 
important condition governing access to regulatory space’ (Hancher and Moran, 
1989, p.161). 
 
Within the regulatory space actors are also examined from the point of view of 
their actions and intentions, and by their capacity for the mobilisation of 
resources and power competences, cooperation and, more importantly, by how 
they manage, use and share important information. Across the regulatory 
                                                        
3 The authors refer, more broadly, to ‘economic regulation’: for the purposes of this analysis, 
employment regulation will be considered as just one of the aspects of economic regulation.  
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space, parties bargain, co-operate, threaten, or act according to semi-
articulated customary assumptions. ‘The allocation of roles between rule-
makers, enforcers and bearers of sectional interests constantly shift, again 
obeying no obvious public-private dichotomy’ (Hancher and Moran, 1989, p. 
152). It could therefore be suggested that the regulatory space does not 
necessarily follow a hierarchical and immutable structure, but that a relationship 
between actors and sources of influence, or institutional affiliation, generates a 
continuous process of adaptation and counterbalance: that is, a dynamic and 
fluid entity. These features underline the complexity within regulatory space and 
the resulting difficulties in finding a hierarchical structure within the system to 
help better understand regulatory transformations in the world of work and 
employment. 
 
Even if the actors of regulatory space may not experience regulation in a non-
hierarchical conception, as Scott (2001, p. 352) has suggested, ‘the relationship 
between the regulating agency and the regulated parties is one of the 
interdependence, rather than a traditional relationship characterised by 
command and control’ (Barry, 2009, p. 73). The analysis of employment 
regulation requires, thus, a deeper focus on the forms of co-operation, 
exchange, interaction and interdependence among the actors within the 
regulatory space. As Vibert points out, regulatory space theory allows the 
observer to look at the regulatory activities from a perspective that takes the 
distance from the rigid hierarchical and networks analysis typical of political 
science (Vibert, 2014, p. 20). Relatedly, regulatory theory acknowledges 
implicitly the important dynamic of ‘power’ as an inherent feature in the process 
of regulation. Dundon et al. (2014) have demonstrated, through a multi-level 
analysis of regulation on information and consultation rights, that power 
relations influence employment regulations and attendant outcomes, shaped to 
a large degree by the resource mobilization capability of the respective actors, 
especially large multinational corporations, employer associations and state 
agencies.  
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The theory of regulatory space fosters comparative studies and comparisons 
between national systems of employment relations: the place, as well as the 
time, of regulation matters. Hancher and Moran (1989, p159) explain that the 
most important way to analyse regulation and its space dimension is to consider 
the boundaries of the nation-state Each nation produces its rules by following 
different political and constitutional responses; it conceives different relations 
between public and private, allowing various actors to participate in the 
regulatory arena. These relations are naturally influenced by historical and 
cultural traditions, as well as by current economic and political frameworks. 
Regulatory influences are also affected across levels and between nation-
states, in terms of variable transnational convergence and/or divergence of 
regulatory patterns and sources of influence among actors (Martinez Lucio and 
McKenzie, 2004). To this end a multi-level approach applicable across different 
spaces (e.g. transnational, national, sectoral or workplace) is considered next.  
 
IV) Analysing regulatory space: incorporating the broader socio-
economic and political dimension  
Taking into account the variety regulatory forms, this section will develop a 
broader  employment regulation framework. Four dimensions will be presented 
which explain how this rule-based system works and, procedurally, how these 
rules are generated (and constantly re-generated). The dimensions outlined in 
the framework take account of Vibert’s three overarching types of regulation 
(Vibert, 2014, pp. 14-15). 
 
The first of these types is related to the rules coming from governments or 
government agencies. These rules can be supported by the coercive power or 
the law and are usually expressed as ‘official regulation’. In the proposed 
framework, the law dimension is intended to have a broader significance: 
instead of referring to only ‘government’ coercion, we discuss the wider socio-
economic and political role of the ‘state’, in which government is just one of the 
structural institutions. The second type occurs ‘when rules emanate from and 
are enforced by a private body with rule-making authority’ (Vibert, 2014). This 
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process is often referred as ‘self-regulation’. In our framework this type of 
regulation may include the unilateral and/or voluntary agreement processes of 
industrial relations rule-making. The third type is called co-regulation: in this 
process of rule-making, ‘private bodies may borrow official authority’ in order to 
create rules. The proposed framework identifies both voluntarist and co-
determination dimensions which are capable of capturing the range of co-
regulatory processes between different actors and state agencies.  
 
The proposed framework, illustrated in Table 1, is not presenting a static or 
specific hierarchy within the system: the four dimensions are regarded as 
complementary and fluid elements of the regulatory activity. Furthermore, it 
must be remembered that these regulatory spaces change accordingly to the 
contextualisation in time and space (i.e. the historical moment and the national 
jurisdiction). In a multi-level analysis of the regulatory space, ‘when regulatory 
authority is dispersed across different actors and levels of government, 
hierarchical types of regulation are said to face inherent limitations, leading to a 
greater emphasis on modes of regulation that stress bargaining and 
deliberation’ (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 373). Therefore, this framework aims to 
take account of the broader socio-economic and political dimension of 
regulatory activity within and between different actors across multiple spaces. 
According to Hancher and Moran:  
  
‘The result in the sphere of regulation is that decisions cannot be made, 
let alone implemented, by involving only a small group in the regulatory 
process. Social complexity ensures that effective regulation typically 
demands the co-operation of countless interdependent social actors, 
often including those well beyond the boundaries of any conventionally 
defined regulatory community’ (Hancher and Moran, 1989, p. 169). 
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Table 1 Law  Co-Determination Voluntarism  Unilateralism 
 
International 
Level 
 
  
International Law:  
ILO Conventions  
 
EU Law: 
EU Human Rights 
Regulations  
Directives 
Recommendations 
Policies 
Soft Law 
 
European Works 
Councils 
Collective Bargaining at EU 
level (Agreements between 
Employers and Employee 
representatives at EU level) 
 
Regulation by 
Transnational Agents 
(ECB, IMF) 
 
National  
Level  
 
Constitution 
Acts  
Case Law 
Registered 
Employment 
Agreements; 
Joint Labour 
Committees 
 
Statutory Collective 
Bargaining  
 
Social Partnership 
 
Collective Bargaining  
 
 
Corporatist Regulation 
 
Regulation by 
Managerial or Union 
Associations 
Workplace 
Level 
Codes of Practice* 
 
Customs  
 
 
Board Level 
Representation 
 
Company Law, 
Provision for Workers’ 
Participation (German 
Case) 
 
Worker’s buy-out 
 
Decentralized Collective 
Bargaining (workplace) 
 
Non-Union Voice 
 
Employment contract 
Managerial Prerogative 
 
Human Resource 
Management 
 
Conflict 
 
 12 
3.1) Law  
According to Kahn-Freund (1972, p. 5),: ‘the principal purpose of labour law is 
to regulate, to support and to restrain the power of management and the power 
of organised labour’. Labour law is indeed an inherently political matter: 
according to Hepple (2013, p. 30), ‘labour law is the outcome of struggles 
between different social actors and ideologies, of power relationships’. This 
paper contends that labour law is one of the main sources of contemporary 
employment regulation, but not the only one: areas of regulation may overlap 
with other legal spheres; for instance, company law, fiscal law or administrative 
law have to be taken in consideration.  
 
Within the regulatory space, law assumes facilitative functions; it also has a 
proceduralist dimension (Morgan and Yeung, 2007, p. 59), precisely for its 
attitude to generating hierarchies and organised systems. Adams and Deakin 
(2014, p. 802) further argue that ‘a legal system is needed to make labour 
market work, and the techniques used to actualize this process, encapsulated 
in the discipline and methodology of labour law, involve a role for fairness 
norms as well as mechanisms for co-ordination of exchange’. Therefore, law is 
not just an instrument for co-ordinating society but is also a channel through 
which policies are realized and provided with effectiveness: ‘worker-protective 
labour law continues to have the potential to realize a progressive policy 
agenda’ (Adams and Deakin, 2014, p. 781). 
 
Consistent with Dickens (2004, p. 602), the proposed framework posits that the 
significance of law as the main or only influence shaping employment decisions 
may be over-estimated, especially when it is analysed at the company level. 
Indeed, it has long been established in employment relations literature that a 
complex web of formal and informal rule-making processes and groups of 
actors are able to mediate and moderate the influence of legal regulation (Fox, 
1974; Dundon and Rollinson, 2001; Farnham, 2014). 
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Arguably, therefore, greater attention must be directed to the limits of the legal 
approach: it is necessary to take account of the so-called ‘design failures’ that, 
for instance, might be caused by ‘vague standards and rules creating legal 
uncertainty, lack of coordination and consistency between different measures 
and incentives, or the structural inability to adjust rules according to changing 
environments’ (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000, p. 31). In this sense, recent 
calls for the simplification of labour law or for better regulation, evidence the 
attempt to respond to the limitations of an excessively legalistic paradigm. 
Recognising that the relationship between the actors within the employment 
regulation is not shaped by legal regulation alone, it is now necessary to outline 
additional dimensions capable of capturing other aspects of employment 
regulation.  
 
3.2) Co-Determination  
Co-determination is one mechanism to make decisions within a company, which 
directly involves the employees and gives them participatory rights. The main 
example of a co-determination system is the German model of industrial 
relations, where the law specifically provides space for co-determination 
procedures (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2002, p. 22). Here, law does not directly 
regulate all aspects of the employment relationship; instead, the legal 
framework allows employees to participate in a democratic decision-making 
process. In specific situations, such as work councils or supervisory 
management boards, companies must consult and include worker 
representatives in decisions. The particularity of co-determination is that its 
requirement is strongly supported and shaped by the legal framework to 
support actors in making employment rules and policies.  
 
Jackson (2005, p. 237) has described co-determination as a ‘highly ambitious, 
but remarkably adaptable institution’). In Germany, the institution of co-
determination has changed over time: ‘politically, codetermination was a 
compromise, resulting from particular state strategies to repress organized 
labour, employer strategies to maintain a paternalistic authority, and employee 
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strategies to democratize the workplace and establish rights of industrial 
citizenship. Works councils emerged having a “dual” mandate to represent the 
interests of employees and cooperate in the interests of the firm’ (Jackson, 
2005, p. 245).  
 
The importance of this institution has been widely recognized and has 
generated some attempts to introduce this model among the EU member states 
through homogeneous legislation. From the 1970s the European Commission 
fostered three main initiatives in order to propose a European model of co-
determination within the workplace. In particular, in 1972 and 1983 the 
Commission sponsored the Fifth company law directive with the aim of 
introducing board-level employee representation. All the initiatives were 
opposed by employers, US corporate lobbying, national governments and 
problems with the harmonization of different national practices (Hyman, 2010, p. 
71). 
 
The final result of the attempt of introducing a model of codetermination in 
Europe has been the European Directive on the European Work Councils (EWC 
Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994, recently revised in January 2012). 
This aimed to introduce structures to ensure information and consultation for 
employees of multinational companies with sites in more than one EU Member 
State and employing a certain number of workers. However, as form of co-
determination, EWC mechanisms are not without critics. For example, Streeck 
argues that EWCs are ‘neither European nor works councils’ (Streeck, 1997), 
and the aim of harmonizing the different national industrial relations 
backgrounds through the mean of Multinational Corporations has not brought 
the awaited results (Marginson et al., 2004). In short, co-determination may be 
another form of employment regulation, yet it also remains as contestable as 
other regulatory spaces. It is therefore important to analyse the further 
development of this area of regulation, as it contains great potential for 
expansion in the context of a greater ‘transnationalization’ of work and 
businesses within the EU.  
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3.3) Voluntarism  
As previously outlined, in employment regulation law is required to protect 
workers by limiting the imbalance of bargaining power between the employer 
and the employees, and to give them effective rights through a fair employment 
contract. Voluntarism is typically most prevalent as a form of rule-making in 
liberal market economies.  
 
In voluntarism, the law ‘encourages’ and ‘facilitates’ the parties to voluntarily 
arrive at their own rule-making agreement, with a minimum floor of rights for 
workers (such as health and safety or unfair dismissal protections). This form of 
agreement-making can theoretically occur through relationships at 
supranational, national, local, sectoral, plant or individual level. The outcome of 
the voluntary collective (or individual) bargaining process might or might not 
assume (depending on the specific institutional design of the state) the force of 
law, or an erga omnes effect.4 For example, the UK and Ireland provide for a 
minimum legal wage, but under voluntary bargaining, the parties can negotiate 
a wage above the minimum rate. While such a negotiated outcome has no 
statutory force, the agreed rate becomes incorporated into the legal contract of 
employment for the individual concerned.  
 
Historically, voluntarism (in the context of the Weimar Republic) has been 
explained as a system of governing norms: ‘In bargaining collectively, 
employers and trade unions did not enter into contractual relations but rather 
engaged in the autonomous creation of norms governing the relations of third 
parties’ (Dukes, 2014, p. 12). However, voluntarism does not include just 
collective bargaining but also encompasses other ways of achieving regulation 
through a workplace rule or corporate procedure. Hence, other processes may 
be viewed as instruments of voluntarism; for instance, the Social Dialogue at 
supranational European level; the voluntary Social Partnership system at 
national level (as in Ireland, although this collapsed following the economic 
                                                        
4 Controversial issues about the effectiveness and the regularity of these procedures have been 
analysed by the European Court of Justice (i.e. in Laval case) in order to avoid conflicts with 
other EU regulatory sources (i.e.. legislations on economics competition). 
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crisis in 2010); the ‘Concertazione’ (as belonging to the Italian tradition). 
Importantly, voluntary regulation might also be represented at workplace level 
through newer forms of employee-management dialogue; for example, 
decentralized collective bargaining; non-union employee voice channels; or 
individualised voluntary negotiation of the employment contract as found in 
many large multinational corporations (Gollan, 2007; Gunnigle et al., 2009). 
 
It can be further argued that the so-called rise in regulation (typified through 
more and more European legislation) may be a chimera, rather than a fact. In 
the last decade, voluntary regulation has become even more permissive, 
despite the wave of European legislation. This paradox requires explanation. 
For example, legal interventions tend to be weak in reality when it comes to 
protecting employee rights or advancing collective bargaining supports, with a 
generally minimalist or ‘light-touch’ approach that favours voluntary regulation 
over legal intervention (Dobbins, 2010). A further important point is the 
politicised nature of weak regulation, state institutions and the promotion of 
voluntary self-regulation by business leaders. For instance, institutions like the 
Troika and EU have fostered the decentralization of industrial relations with the 
explicit aim of favouring individual employee rights rather than extending or 
widening collective bargaining. In this sense, free market voluntarism has been 
left relatively intact, to the advantage of capital over labour.  
 
Further, the weakening of trade union power in the last decade has narrowed 
the space for these actors to develop their regulatory authority (McDonough 
and Dundon, 2010). O’Sullivan et al. (2015, p. 228) note that, owing to the 
decline in unionisation and increased individual rights, opportunities have 
opened for alternative actors, like citizen advice organizations, civil society 
organizations and solicitors, to speak-up for workers who lack collective 
bargaining protections. It can be argued, therefore, that statutory rights for 
workers have abated in favour of de jure forms of voluntary rule-making 
sympathetic to a free market ideological narrative. The shift in power is shown 
in case-studies in the UK and Ireland, where Information and Consultation 
 17 
regulations for employees are now influenced more by individual managers and 
employers, including the State, who all reinforce their preferences for voluntary 
rule-making among parties (workers and employers) of unequal bargaining 
strength (Dundon et al., 2014, p. 34).  
 
3.4) Unilateralism  
Unilateralism is the provision of regulation by a single authority, typically 
imposed without bargaining or consultation. The dimension presented here is 
not easy to evaluate and assess: unilateralism has a strong sociological and 
political characterisation. The managerial prerogative and literature about union 
avoidance highlights employer strategies and tactics to make decisions based 
on the notion of the property rights argument; that is, labour effort is seen as a 
source of property to be hired and fired at will by managers without the external 
interference of an outside trade union or other employee representative body. 
As a particular means of regulating employment conditions, unilateralism has a 
potential role in the analytical framework to assess regulatory spaces.  
 
At the supranational level it can be described as the imposition of some 
regulation from a superior authority that stands above the national democratic 
regulatory process. An example of unilateralism could be found in the role 
endorsed by the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and 
the European Central Bank, such as imposing austerity measures on those EU 
Member States and workers most affected by the economic crisis.  
 
At national level, unilateralism can be seen in the forms of corporatism and 
lobbying and the idea of corporate ‘self-regulation’. As an example, Crouch has 
particularly stressed the role of large firms and Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) on national regulations: he contends that firms, by the means of political 
power and lobbying, are able to have a place in the ‘room of decision-making’. 
TNCs are able to ‘set standards, establish private regulatory systems, act as 
consultants to government, even have staff seconded to ministers’ offices’. For 
example, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) based in Ireland 
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actively lobbied European government officials and Irish civil servants to 
weaken collective aspects of the Employee Information and Consultation 
Directive (Dir. 2002/14/EC) (Dundon et al., 2014). Further processes of 
influence among corporate capital in relation to the governmental regulatory 
activity can be found in the analysis of the economic role of the State by Stiglitz 
(1992). It is suggested that, although a government cannot be sure that its 
regulation would not be modified by subsequent governments, it can try to 
develop strategies to make this difficult. At this point, the ‘status quo’ may 
assume a particularly significant role. 
 
Finally, at workplace level, the role of Human Resource Management offers 
evidence of unilateral imposition of the conditions of workers. In this regard, 
Sisson (1993, p. 207) notes that there is a lack of ‘any serious legal regulation’ 
that could provide employees with basic standards and guide the work of HR 
Managers. In the UK, Ireland or US, employers and managers often conceive 
managerial strategies in order to avoid the collectivization of workers and 
thereby deny legitimate union recognition and representation (Gall and Dundon, 
2013). For instance, as an example of the unilateral power of management, 
Moore (2014, p. 412) has described as ‘appropriative discretion’ the managerial 
prerogative in respect of employees that gives management the power ‘to 
determine (and subsequently vary) unilaterally the on-going rate of return on 
human capital in real terms’, either by altering the level and/or rigour of work 
expected in return for the same level of money compensation, or else by 
maintaining employees’ prevailing contractual rate of money compensation 
notwithstanding the existence of price inflation of other forms of material 
increase in the cost of living. 
 
The above four dimensions – law, co-determination, voluntarism, unilateralism – 
together offer a more inclusive analytical framework concerning the 
transformation of employment regulation. It is not suggested they are discrete or 
independent dimensions, but in reality are likely to overlap and be inter-
connected. In this way the proposed framework may offer a more dynamic 
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approach to the limitations of a static debate about ‘regulation versus de-
regulation’, which we turn to next.  
 
IV) Regulation, de-regulation, re-regulation  
Regulatory space is always changing: it is subject to a continuous process of 
innovation from the point of view of its actors, instruments and contents. The 
process of change is the outcome of multiple sets of decisions and transfers 
(Martinez Lucio and McKenzie, 2004, p. 94). Neo-liberal policies or liberal 
market changes in regulatory space are often defined as ‘deregulation’, while 
coordinated market regimes are seen as more rule-bound and ‘regulated’ 
(Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000, p. 25). With the aim of exploring this 
debate, the dichotomy between ‘regulation’ versus ‘deregulation’ is subject to 
critical and more in depth analysis. As Esping-Andersen and Regini (2000, p24) 
outline, the real meaning of ‘deregulation’ of the labour market is ‘multi-
dimensional and basically ambiguous’. Deregulation can therefore be described 
from three different perspectives (Vibert, 2014):  
 
1) As an ‘attempt for minimizing all rules on individual behaviour and all the 
functions performed by state and associational institutions, in order to 
increase the individual autonomy of individual firms and workers’ ;  
2) As an instrument for removing rules and institutions that are able to 
impose ‘excessive rigidities on labour market activity’.  
3) As ‘the processes which scale down the role of some instruments of 
economic regulation – such as the law, or tripartite concertation – to the 
advantage of others – decentralized collective bargaining, or informal 
agreements’.  
 
However, from a regulatory space theory, all the definitions presented above 
describe ‘deregulation’ as a process of redefining and rebalancing allocation 
within the regulatory arena. If we consider the two first descriptions of the term, 
it could be found that deregulation does not indicate a process, but rather an 
outcome. The implied narrative of ‘deregulation’ in this regard includes a strong 
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value-laden judgement because, while describing a simple mechanism for 
regulation, it implies the idea of lower protections.  
 
Deregulation, as an instrument for minimizing labour rules and protections 
connected with the idea of flexibility of the labour market, has been a central 
issue in the debates of the last decades, especially in times of economic and 
financial crisis. As Hepple (2013, p. 33) reports, the deregulatory process has 
often been described ‘as an absence of regulation… in fact, it meant leaving 
regulation to ordinary market rules, to the private law of property and contract’. 
In some European countries (e.g. Italy, Spain and Portugal), recent labour 
reforms have been presented as an instrument for the rebalancing-of-protection 
in the national labour market between standard and non-standard workers, with 
the covert aim of deregulation. This has a distinct ideological intent which has 
been criticized by some authors interested in considering the socio-political 
outcomes of deregulation (De Stefano, 2014, p. 285). In reality, as Scott (2001, 
p. 337) has pointed out, ‘deregulation’, ironically, often involves the 
development of systematic regulation over state bodies which develop and 
administer regulation’. It has been shown that the regulatory authority is 
dispersed between the actors within the regulatory space: Scott reported, by 
showing the result of an official investigation, that in the absence of State 
regulation, a privatised company can become de facto the regulator of the 
market. This demonstrates that ‘even policies of de-regulation cannot 
completely displace regulation’ (Scott, 2001, p. 337). In short, neo-liberal free 
market ideologues have to impose extensive regulation in order to de-regulate.   
 
This example leads to an important consideration about the nature of 
deregulation: the term entails a necessary and continuous process of re-
regulation, rather than the simple removal or minimization of rules: as Majone 
(1990) argues, de-regulation nearly always entails some re-regulation. 
 
From the point of view of regulatory space theory, re-regulation can therefore 
underpin informal processes of regulation as well as formal channels for 
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regulation: when there is an empty space, left by the absence or the removal of 
law provisions, other actors might intervene in order to influence or impose their 
rules in that specific area. In these cases, voluntarism and unilateralism might 
play a major role, shifting the power of decisions from the centre (the 
supranational or national authority) to the periphery.5  
 
Similarly, the misleading use of deregulation has been highlighted by 
MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio (2005), who argue that the term deregulation 
‘tends to reduce the conceptualization of regulation to a dichotomy viewed in 
terms of the quantitative absence or presence of regulation, which is 
inappropriate as it is insensitive to the variety of ways in which the functions of 
regulation can be performed’ (MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005, p. 501). 
Echoing Standing (1997), Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie suggest ‘there is no 
such a thing as the ‘deregulation’ of labour markets. No society could exist 
without modes of regulation’ (Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004, p. 82).  
 
Hence, the mainstream conceptualization of deregulation as a mechanism for 
‘removing rules’ and lowering protections can disguise the use of regulation to 
actually advance an agenda of minimal and weaker employment right across 
the labour market, favouring employers, TNCs and State agencies. 
Deregulation is, in effect, a more complex process that often requires on-going 
re-regulation, even if it is coming from different political agencies and regulatory 
institutions. Accordingly, we argue a more appropriate way to describe the 
process of re-distribution of regulatory space (e.g. the downsizing of the role of 
the law and the dismantling of specific norms in favour of others forms of 
regulation, such as voluntarism or unilateralism) could better found in the 
concept of ‘re-regulation’.  
                                                        
5 Gino Giugni describes this process as a process of ‘devolution of regulatory power’ to other 
regulatory authorities. In his discourse he distinguishes the different kind of policy of labour in 
three fundamental directions: ‘de-regulation’, ‘re-regulation’ and ‘devolution or re-formalization’. 
His analysis is oriented on a labour law perspective; hence, in the passage about de-regulation 
he also mentions that this term is often (mis)used, without solid and scientifc basics, to imply the 
restoration of the principle of the market balance. He therefore accepts the therm ‘de-regulation’ 
when it is implied to point out the removal of useless or inadequates rules (Giugni, 1986, p. 331; 
translation made by the author).  
 22 
 
De-regulation in contemporary political and socio-economical spaces requires 
extensive regulation: for example, the de-regulation of financial markets 
requires the passing of very complex and detailed regulations in order to re-
regulate the market. Likewise, protective legislation (e.g. a national minimum 
wage) is in itself a detailed regulatory requirement. Hence, we consider that the 
concept of re-regulation is a better way to capture the dynamic processes of 
employment transformation and change.  
 
V) Conclusion 
In the advancing understanding of employment regulation, it is important to 
investigate how regulation occurs and changes over time and space. The lens 
of regulatory space opens up new avenues and possibities to examine how 
work rules and laws are contested and reconsidered. The proposed framework 
offers a multi-level pathway (across supranational, national and workplace) and 
the varieties of regulatory mechanisms. Indeed, the proposed framework goes 
beyond a traditional understanding of regulation as a legal matter: it 
encompasses other means of regulation such as co-determination, voluntarism 
and unilateralism.  
According to the analysis of the four dimensions of the regulatory space, the 
difficulty of finding a hierarchical structure within the framework has been 
stressed, as the regulatory authorities can overlap and the process of regulation 
may follow power relationships that go beyond the overall structure provided by 
the law.  
Finally, the regulatory space perspective allows  a consideration of the process 
of regulatory change as a mechanism of re-distributing space among the actors, 
rather than the simple absence or removal of legal rules. Accordingly, the 
analysis of the responses to changes within regulatory processes has been 
considered of vital importance to better understand the diversity of employment 
regulation. It is, however, a future goal and a challenge for others to test, 
analyse and examine the utility of the proposed framework empirically..  
 
 23 
Bibliography  
Adams, Z., Deakin, S. (2014) ‘Institutional Solutions to Precariousness and Inequality 
in Labour Markets’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 52 (4): 779-809.  
Baldwin, M., Cave, M., Lodge, M. (2012) Understanding Regulation, OUP, 2nd ed.  
Barry, M. (2009) The regulatory framework for HRM, in A. Wilkinson et al. (eds.), The 
SAGE handbook of Human Resource Management, SAGE, London, 71-83.  
Budd, J. W. (2004) Employment with a Human Face: Balancing Efficiency, Equity and 
Voice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.  
Colling, T., Terry, M. (2010) Industrial Relations, 3rd ed., Wiley, Chichester. 
Collins, H. (2001) ‘Regulating the employment relation for competitiveness’, Industrial 
Law Journal, 30 (1): 17-47.  
Collins, H., Davies, P. and Rideout, R. (2000) Legal regulation of the employment 
relation, Kluwer and Institute of Advanced Legal Studies.  
De Stefano, V. (2014), ‘A tale of oversimplification and deregulation: the mainstream 
approach to labour market segmentation and recent responses to the crisis in 
European countries’, Industrial Law Journal, 43 (3): 253-285. 
Dickens L. (2004) ‘Problems of Fit: Changing Employment and Labour Regulation’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47 (4): 596-616.  
Dobbins, T. (2010) ‘The case for “beneficial constraints”: why permissive voluntarism 
impedes workplace cooperation in Ireland’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 
31(4): 497-519.  
Dukes, R. (2014) The labour constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Dundon, T.,  Gonzalez-Perez, M., McDonough, T. (2007) ‘Bitten by the Celtic Tiger: 
immigrant workers and industrial relations in the new “Glocalised” Ireland’, 
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 28 (4): 501-522. 
Dundon, T., Dobbins, T., Cullinane, N., Hickland, E., Donaghey, J. (2014) ‘Employer 
occupation of regulatory space for the Employee Information and Consultation (I&C) 
Directive in Liberal Market Economies’, Work, Employment & Society, 28 (1): 21-39. 
Dundon, T., Rollinson, D. (2011) Understanding Employment Relations, 2e, McGraw 
Hill, London. 
Edwards, P. K. (1989) Conflict at Work, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 24 
Erne R., (2015) ‘A supranational regime that nationalize social conflict: Explaining 
European trade unions’ difficulties in politicizing European economic governance’, 
Labor History, 56 (3): 345-368.  
Esping-Andersen, G., Regini, M. (2000) Why deregulate labour markets?, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Farnham, D. (2014) The Changing Faces of Employment Relations: Global, 
comparative and theoretical perspectives, Palgrave, London. 
Fox, A. (1974) Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations, Faber, London. 
Gall, G., Dundon, T. (2013), Global anti-unionism: nature, dynamics, trajectories and 
outcomes, Palgrave, London.  
Giugni, G. (1986) ‘Giuridificazione e deregolazione nel diritto del lavoro italiano’, 
Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 30: 317–341.  
Gollan, P. J. (2007) Employee Representation in Non-Union Firms, Sage, London.  
Gunnigle, P., Lavelle, J., McDonnell, A. (2009) ‘Subtle but deadly? Union avoidance 
through “double breasting” among multinational companies’, in Advances in 
Industrial & Labor Relations, 16: 51-73. 
 Hancher, L. and Moran, M. (1989) ‘Organizing regulatory space’ in L. Hancher and M. 
Moran (eds) Capitalism, Culture, and Economic Regulation, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
Hepple, B. (2013), ‘Factors Influencing the Making and Transformation of Labour Law 
in Europe’, in G. Davidov, B. Langille, The Idea of Labour Law, OUP, Oxford, p. 30. 
Jackson, G. (2005) ‘Contested boundaries: ambiguity and creativity in the evolution of 
German Codetermination’, in Streeck, W., Thelen, K., Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional change in advanced political economies, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 229-254.  
Kahn-Freund, O. (1972) Labour and the law, Stevens, London.  
MacKenzie, R., Martinez Lucio, M. (2005) ‘The realities of Regulatory Change: Beyond the 
fetish of Deregulation’, Sociology, 39(3): 499-517.  
 Majone, G. (1990) Deregulation or reregulation? Regulatory reform in Europe and 
the United States, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Marginson, P., Hall, M., Hoffmann, A., Muller, T. (2004) ‘The impact of European works 
councils on management decision-making in UK and US-based multinationals’, 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 42 (2): 209-233.  
Martinez Lucio, M., MacKenzie, R. (2004) “Unstable boundaries?” Evaluating for the 
new regulation within employment relations, Economy and Society, 33 (1): 77-97.  
 25 
McDonough, T., Dundon, T. (2010) ‘Thatcherism Delayed? The Irish crisis and the 
paradox of social partnership’, in Industrial Relations Journal, 41 (6): 544-562. 
Moore, M. T. (2014), ‘Reconstituting Labour Market Freedom: Corporative Governance 
and Collective Worker Counterbalance’, in Industrial Law Journal, 43 (4): 398.  
Morgan, B., Yeung K. (2007) An introduction to Law and Regulation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. . 
O’Sullivan, M., Turner, T., Kennedy, M., Wallace, J. (2015) ‘Is individual employment 
law displacing the role of trade unions?’, Industrial Law Journal, 44 (2): 222-245. 
OECD (2012) Better Regulation in Europe – the EU 15 project, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/betterregulationineurope-
theeu15project.htm. 
Rubery, J. (2015) ‘Change at work: feminization, flexibilisation, fragmentation and 
financialisation’, Employees Relations: The International Journal, 37 ,(6). 
Rubery, J., Grimshaw, D. (2003) The Organization of Employment: An International 
Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan.  
Rubery, J., Rafferty, A. (2013) ‘Women and recession revisited’, Work, Employment 
and Society, 27 (3): 414-432.  
Scott, C. (2001) ‘Analysing regulatory space: Fragmented resources and institutional 
design’, Public Law, Summer Issue: 329-353. 
Sisson, K. (1993) ‘In search of HRM’, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1993, 31 
(2): 201-211. 
Standing, G. (1997) ‘Globalization, labour, flexibility and insecurity: the era of market 
regulation’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 3 (1): 7-37.   
Stone K. V. W., Arthurs, H. (2013), Rethinking workplace regulation: Beyond the 
standard contract of employment, Russell Sage Foundation Publications.  
Streeck, W. (1997) ‘Neither European nor works councils: a reply to Paul Knutsen’, 
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 18 (2): 325-337.  
Thompson, P., Newsome, K., Commander, J. (2013) ‘Good when they want to be: 
migrant workers in the supermarket supply chain’, Human Resource Management 
Journal, 23 (2): 129-143. 
Van Den Abeele, E. (2010) The European union’s better regulation agenda, ETUI, 
available at: https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Reports/The-European-union-s-
better-regulation-agenda .  
 26 
. Vibert, F. (2014) The new regulatory space: Reframing democratic governance, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Lord Wedderburn (1965) The worker and the law, Penguin Books Ltd., 
Harmondsworth. 
 
 
